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Introduction
Anti-discrimination policy takes many forms. For example, a¢ rmative action policies primarily target the hiring decision, whereas pay equity policies target wages directly. The extent to which these policies improve the labor market outcomes of disenfranchised workers depends on what kind of barriers these workers face. A¢ rmative action will be most e¤ective if disenfranchised workers face barriers to employment at "good" …rms. Pay equity will be most e¤ective when workers face wage disparity within …rms. We investigate whether immigrant and ethnic minority workers'adverse wage outcomes are driven by poor access to high-wage …rms or poor access to high-wage jobs within …rms.
Wage disparity can also take many forms. Between-group di¤erences in conditional mean wages have been studied extensively. Recently, researchers have begun to focus on other aspects of the conditional wage distribution. Albrecht et al. (2003) , Arulampalam et al. (2007) , de la Rica et al. (forthcoming) , Pendakur and Pendakur (2006) and others have found evidence that disadvantaged workers in several countries face a glass ceiling: a barrier that limits access to high-wage jobs. Because of data limitations, however, these papers cannot distinguish whether these outcomes are driven by poor access to jobs at high-wage …rms, or poor wage outcomes within …rms.
In this paper, we introduce the idea of a glass door. This is a barrier that limits disadvantaged workers' access to employment at high-wage …rms. Just as a glass ceiling truncates the distribution of wages that disadvantaged workers face, a glass door truncates the distribution of …rms at which they might …nd employment. Our main objective is to assess the extent to which exclusion from high-wage jobs -that is, a glass ceiling -is driven by a glass door. To do so, we develop a summary measure of how much the sorting of disadvantaged workers across …rms decreases (or increases) their wages. We call this the glass door e¤ect. We show how to measure the glass door e¤ect on average wages, as well as its e¤ect at a given quantile of the wage distribution. In fact, under a particular model of wage determination, the glass door e¤ect is the di¤erence between a within-…rm conditional (mean or quantile) wage gap measure, and a corresponding economy-wide measure. As a consequence, it is straightforward to test whether the glass door e¤ect is zero.
Investigating glass doors requires data on multiple employees of multiple …rms. To our knowledge, there are no such U.S. survey data. Some administrative data (e.g., the US Census Bureau's 1 con…dential Longitudinal Employer-Household Dynamics Program database) link employees to their employers, but they contain only limited information about the characteristics of workers, their jobs, and their employers. Consequently, our investigation uses a recent Statistics Canada survey of workers and their employers: the Workplace and Employee Survey (WES). The WES surveys multiple employees of …rms, so we can compare wage outcomes of ethnic minority and/or immigrant workers with their Canadian-born white coworkers.
We …nd that Canadian-born ethnic minority workers do not face signi…cant glass ceilings or glass doors. In contrast, immigrants face substantial conditional mean and conditional quantile wage gaps. Furthermore, these wage gaps are largely accounted for by glass doors.
Glass Ceilings, Sticky Floors and Glass Doors
A glass ceiling is a barrier to labour market success that operates at the upper end of the wage distribution. For example, a glass ceiling might limit some workers'access to management jobs. This phenomenon has been studied mainly in the context of the male-female wage gap. Albrecht et al. (2003) suggest a method to detect a glass ceiling via quantile regression. They reason that because a glass ceiling limits the ability of disadvantaged workers to "rise to the top," it introduces large wage gaps at upper quantiles of the wage distribution. However, a glass ceiling has little (if any) e¤ect on wage gaps at lower quantiles, so that this pattern is easy to detect by comparing quantile regression estimates at di¤erent quantiles. In our work, we distinguish between economy-wide glass ceilings, which limit access to high-wage jobs in the economy as whole, from within-…rm glass ceilings, which limit access to high-wage jobs within …rms. Albrecht et al. (2003) found evidence that Swedish women face an economy-wide glass ceiling.
Subsequent authors have identi…ed other patterns in wage di¤erentials across quantiles. For example, de la Rica et al. (forthcoming) and Arulampalam et al. (2007) …nd evidence that women in some European countries face larger wage di¤erentials at the bottom of the conditional wage distribution than at upper quantiles. Pendakur and Pendakur (2006) observe the same for some ethnic minorities in Canada. These authors call this a sticky ‡oor, because it is evidence that disadvantaged workers are crowded into very low-wage jobs. de la Rica et al. (forthcoming) argue that a sticky ‡oor could be a consequence of statistical discrimination if employers believe a group of workers are at high risk of quitting. Pendakur and Pendakur (2006) suggest a sticky ‡oor could arise if rents are larger at the bottom of the wage distribution than the top. A 2 sticky ‡oor could also arise if anti-discrimination policy is most e¤ective at the top of the wage distribution, e.g., if policy primarily targets minority representation in management jobs.
Previous work in this area has focused on economy-wide glass ceilings (and sticky ‡oors) because available data could not distinguish within-…rm from economy-wide wage outcomes. Of course, the economy-wide patterns observed by other authors might arise because disadvantaged workers face a glass ceiling (or sticky ‡oor) within …rms. However, Abowd et al. (1999) , Woodcock (2007) , and others have shown that inter-…rm wage di¤erences account for about one third of all wage variation. Thus, an alternative explanation is that these workers do not face within-…rm …rm glass ceilings, but some barrier limits their ability to obtain employment at high-wage …rms. We call this a glass door.
We look for evidence of a glass door by comparing within-…rm wage gaps to economy-wide wage gaps (i.e., wage gaps that average over …rms). In the next section, we show that this di¤erence -which we call the glass door e¤ect -has a speci…c and useful interpretation under a particular model of wage determination. Intuitively, if disadvantaged workers have better wage outcomes within …rms than they do economy-wide, it indicates that their low wage outcomes are partly the result of how they sort across …rms.
Our investigation of the glass door e¤ect considers three features of the conditional wage distribution: conditional means, conditional quantiles and conditional representation. We examine the e¤ect of glass doors on conditional mean wages to assess whether or not immigrant and ethnic minority workers are, on average, employed in …rms that pay lower wages than their Canadian-born white counterparts. We estimate the glass door e¤ect at various quantiles to assess whether glass doors contribute to economy-wide glass ceilings and sticky ‡oors. We also measure the representation of immigrant and ethnic minority workers in tails of the economy-wide and within-…rm conditional wage distributions. This allows us to directly assess the consequences of glass ceilings and glass doors. Whereas it may be hard to interpret whether or not a wage gap at the top decile is of policy importance, knowing the magnitude of minority under-representation in the top decile may connect more directly with policy discussion.
Aydemir and Skuterud (forthcoming) also use the WES to investigate the role of …rms in determining immigrant wage outcomes. They …nd evidence that male immigrants sort primarily into low-paying establishments, whereas female immigrants sort primarily into low-paying jobs within establishments. There are important di¤erences between their study and this one. First, they focus exclusively on conditional mean wages of immigrants. Consequently, their results are not informative of the interplay between glass ceilings, sticky ‡oors, and glass doors; they are also not informative of the outcomes of non-immigrant ethnic minorities. More subtly, their measure of the contribution of inter-…rm sorting to immigrant wage gaps confounds the consequences of sorting on immigrant status with sorting on other observable characteristics. We return to this point in the next section, after discussing how we measure the glass door e¤ect.
Methodology
We begin by comparing average (log) wages of minority (i.e., ethnic minority or immigrant) and majority workers using the linear regression model:
Here, y i is the log wage of worker i; x i is a vector of characteristics that a¤ect wages (e.g., educational attainment, labor market experience, etc.); measures the returns to those characteristics; g i is a vector of indicator variables for membership in a minority group; and measures the di¤erence in average log wages of minority and majority workers who share the same observed characteristics x i .
To investigate whether minority workers face an economy-wide glass ceiling or sticky ‡oor, we estimate wage gaps at several quantiles of the conditional wage distribution. We measure the wage gap at the th conditional quantile using the quantile regression that satis…es:
where measures the returns to characteristics at the th quantile, and measures the di¤erence between the th quantile of log wages of minority and majority workers, conditional on x i .
Estimates of at several quantiles illustrate how wage di¤erentials vary over the conditional wage distribution.
Wage di¤erentials at various quantiles are only partly illustrative of minority workers'access to high-wage jobs. An alternative is to measure the proportion of minority workers in regions of the wage distribution, especially the tails. Following Pendakur, Pendakur, and Woodcock (2008), we call the proportion of a minority group's workers whose wages fall into a region of the population conditional wage distribution their representation in that region. Representation of minority workers in the lower tail of the wage distribution meaningfully quanti…es possible crowding into low-wage jobs. Likewise, representation in the upper tail meaningfully quanti…es possible exclusion from high-wage jobs.
The representation index of Pendakur, Pendakur, and Woodcock (2008) is intuitive and straightforward to construct. We estimate quantiles of the population wage distribution, conditional on characteristics x i ; from the quantile regression that satis…es:
Note that eq. (3) does not condition on group membership g i . We use coe¢ cient estimates from eq. (3),^ , to estimate quantiles of the population conditional wage distribution,ŷ i = x 0 i^ , for each worker given their characteristics. The conditional representation of group g below the th quantile is
where N g is the number of members of group g and I denotes the indicator function. This measures the proportion of workers in group g who earn less than the th quantile of the population conditional wage distribution, given their characteristics x i : We can de…ne representation above the th conditional quantile analogously. If r g > ; the proportion of the group's members below the th quantile exceeds the population proportion, and we say the group is over-represented in that region. Likewise, if r g < ; we say the group is under-represented in that region. Figure 1 illustrates the relationship between quantile wage di¤erentials and the representation index for a particular x i . The …gure shows the cumulative distribution function of wages for a hypothetical population (F pop ), a reference group (F 0 ), and a minority group (F g ). At a given quantile ; the quantile wage di¤erential between group g and the reference group, g ; is the horizontal distance between F g and F 0 : At the th population quantile, y ; the vertical distance between F g and F 0 is the di¤erence between representation of the two groups, r g r 0 :
Glass Door E¤ects
We estimate glass door e¤ects by comparing economy-wide wage gaps, which average over …rms, to within-…rm wage gaps. The di¤erence between these estimates is informative of the extent to which wage outcomes are driven by how minority workers sort across employers, versus how 5 they sort into jobs within employers.
Our within-…rm measures condition on employer identity. That is, we augment the regression models described above with …rm e¤ects. These encompass both observed and unobserved employer characteristics. In the mean regression case, equation (1) becomes:
where f i is a vector of indicators for each …rm and is a vector of …rm e¤ects. The …rm e¤ects measure inter-…rm di¤erences in average wages, conditional on characteristics x i and group membership g i :
If the true …rm e¤ects (i.e., their population values, as opposed to sample estimates) were observable, we could summarize the glass door e¤ect by regressing f 0 i on x i and g i : The coef-…cient on g i in this regression would measure the average …rm e¤ect of each group's members, conditional on their characteristics x i : This is exactly the glass door e¤ect we seek: a measure of how inter-group di¤erences in wages are a¤ected by inter-group di¤erences in sorting across …rms, conditional on characteristics. Of course we can't estimate this regression directly, because the true …rm e¤ects are not observable. However, the following proposition shows that we obtain an unbiased estimate of the glass door e¤ect by comparing estimated wage di¤erentials in speci…cations with and without …rm e¤ects. This is not surprising: it simply specializes the well-known result that omitted variable bias can be represented as least squares coe¢ cients in an arti…cial regression (see, e.g., Greene (2003, pp. 148-149) ). Furthermore, this result holds for more general speci…cations of inter-group conditional wage di¤erences; see the discussion following the appendicized proof.
Proposition 1 (Glass Door E¤ect) Assume equation (5) is correctly speci…ed. Let b and b
be the estimated coe¢ cients on group membership in regressions that include and exclude …rm ef-
Proof. See Appendix
Our measure of the glass door e¤ect di¤ers from how Aydemir and Skuterud (forthcoming) measure the e¤ect of inter-…rm sorting on mean wage gaps. They compare the average …rm e¤ect of immigrants to that of native-born workers. This is the sample analog of the coe¢ cient on g i in the hypothetical regression of f 0 i on g i only. Because characteristics, x i ; are omitted 6 from this hypothetical regression, their measure confounds the returns to sorting on observable characteristics (e.g., education or occupation) with sorting on minority group status. In contrast, our measure conditions out the returns to sorting on these observable characteristics.
It is important to note that a zero glass door e¤ect does not imply that …rm e¤ects do not belong in the model. Rather, it implies that …rm e¤ects are unrelated to group membership, conditional on worker characteristics. The following proposition shows that we can test for the presence of a glass door e¤ect using a Hausman test. The Hausman test applies because under the null of no glass door e¤ect, speci…cations with and without …rm e¤ects both yield consistent estimates of , but the estimate with …rm e¤ects is ine¢ cient. Under the alternative, however, only the speci…cation with …rm e¤ects yields a consistent estimate.
Proposition 2 (Glass Door Test) Under the null hypothesis that equation (5) is correctly speci…ed with spherical errors, but …rm e¤ects are conditionally unrelated to group membership, that is, H 0 : f = 0, the variance of the estimated glass door e¤ect is V ar
under H 0 ; where^ g and^ g are the elements of b and b ; respectively, corresponding to group g:
Remark 3 The variance terms that appear in Proposition 2 are actual (population) variances of the estimated parameters. Under the null, …rm e¤ects are conditionally unrelated to group membership, but may still belong in the model. Consequently, the regression that excludes …rm e¤ects is mis-speci…ed and standard regression output of its estimated coe¢ cient variances is incorrect. The speci…cation that includes …rm e¤ects yields a consistent estimate of the error variance, so we re-scale the sample estimate of V ar h b i by s 2 =s 2 ; where s 2 and s 2 are estimated regression error variances in models with and without …rm e¤ects, respectively. This adjustment is conservative, since it increases the estimated variance of the glass door e¤ect.
In the linear model, eq. (5), the …rm e¤ect is common to all employees of the …rm. It is therefore usually conceptualized as a pure location shift of the conditional wage distribution.
That is, the shape of the wage distribution, conditional on x i and g i ; is the same at every …rm, but its location (mean) di¤ers across …rms. We implement …rm e¤ects in the quantile regression, eq. (6), the same way:
That is, we restrict each …rm's e¤ect to be the same at every quantile of the conditional wage distribution. (Since, in our application, most …rms have fewer than 10 surveyed employees, quantile-speci…c …rm e¤ects would be imprecisely estimated.) We implement the restriction by simultaneously estimating regressions for multiple quantiles and imposing cross-equation restrictions on the …rm e¤ects, as suggested by Koenker (2004). We can test for the glass door e¤ect in the quantile setting as well. As in the linear regression case, it is natural to use a Hausman test. Under the Null hypothesis, models with and without …rm e¤ects both yield consistent estimates of ; but the model with …rm e¤ects is ine¢ cient.
Under the alternative, only the model with …rm e¤ects yields a consistent estimate of . As in the linear model case, the speci…cation that omits …rm e¤ects is mis-speci…ed under the null, so we apply the same conservative adjustment to the estimated variance of the glass door e¤ect in the quantile glass door test. Alternatively, since Angrist et al. (2006) show that estimated quantile regression coe¢ cients are asymptotically normal even under mis-speci…cation, one could directly bootstrap the asymptotic variance of ( ).
Data
Our investigation uses the Workplace and Employee Survey (WES). The WES is one of a few in that year and the next, and a new sample of workers was drawn in the next odd-numbered
year. Because we know the identity of each worker's employer, the WES is ideal to assess the role of …rms in determining wage outcomes.
Our analysis is based on the pooled 1999, 2001, and 2003 cross-sections. We do not use data from even-numbered years for two reasons. First, employee attrition is high in their second survey year and is likely non-random. Second, many sampled workers change employer between survey years and only limited information is collected about their new employer. Also, note that pooling the cross-sections maximizes the number of observed employees of each workplace.
We restrict the sample to non-Aboriginal (i.e., non-Native Indian) workers between 25 and 64 years of age. The restricted sample comprises 58,298 employees of 7,641 workplaces. We observe between one and 55 employees of each …rm; the mean number is 7.6, and the median is 6. Estimates that condition on …rm e¤ects implicitly exclude …rms with only one observed employee, in which case the mean number of employees per …rm is 8.4, and the median is 7. We observe 3,064 …rms in all three survey years, 2,063 …rms in two years, and the remaining 2,514 …rms in only one year.
Our outcome measure is the natural logarithm of hourly wages. We estimate several speci…cations to assess the contribution of observable characteristics, x i , and employer identity, f i , to the wage outcomes of immigrants and ethnic minorities. In the main text, we focus on speci…cations that control for: sex, highest level of schooling (8 categories We estimate all speci…cations that exclude …rm e¤ects separately by sex. We pool men and women in speci…cations that include …rm e¤ects. In this case, we interact all covariates (except the …rm identi…ers) with sex. This restricts …rm e¤ects to be the same for all employees of a …rm, so they re ‡ect a pure location shift of the conditional wage distribution.
We estimate all speci…cations using employee sample weights provided by Statistics Canada.
Although our quantile regression speci…cations with …rm e¤ects are estimated using subroutines optimized for the highly parameterized and sparse nature of the problem, we still face computational constraints that limit the number of …rms we can include in the quantile regressions.
This forces us to subsample from the data. Our reported estimates for quantile regressions with …rm e¤ects are averaged over 50 subsamples. Each subsample consists of all surveyed employees of 1,500 randomly sampled …rms. We sample …rms with replacement in each subsample. To increase precision of the estimated …rm e¤ects, we sample …rms with probabilities proportional to the number of surveyed employees and adjust the employee sample weights accordingly.
Throughout, we estimate standard errors following Statistics Canada's recommended procedure, using 100 sets of provided bootstrap sample weights. In the case of quantile regressions with …rm e¤ects, including the quantile regressions that underlie the within-…rm representation index, we bootstrap the entire estimation procedure (including subsampling and averaging over subsamples) for each set of bootstrap weights.
Results
Table 1 presents our estimates for Canadian-born visible minorities. These workers face substantial within-…rm mean wage di¤erentials: about :05 log points for men and :06 log points for women. However, they do not face large glass doors: the mean glass door e¤ect is :02 log points for women in this group, and :037 log points for men. The glass door test statistic is negative for men, which is a fairly common …nite-sample occurrence for Hausman tests and is usually interpreted as rejection of the null. Evidently these men are employed at higher-wage …rms than their white counterparts, on average, and consequently face no economy-wide wage gap. In contrast, women sort into slightly lower-paying …rms than their white counterparts,
which accounts for about one quarter of the economy-wide wage gap they face.
There is no strong evidence that Canadian-born visible minorities face an economy-wide glass ceiling or sticky ‡oor. Women in this group fare worse in the upper half of the wage distribution than they do in the lower half, but the disparity hits too low in the distribution (somewhere below the median) to characterize this as a glass ceiling in the classic sense. This upper-tail wage disparity does, however, appear to re ‡ect inter-…rm sorting. The point estimates suggest that the quantile glass door e¤ect is positive at lower quantiles but negative at upper quantiles, so that glass doors contribute to the economy-wide pattern in quantile wage disparity. However, the quantile glass door e¤ects are either small in magnitude or statistically insigni…cant at all reported quantiles.
Tables 2 and 3 present our estimates for immigrants to Canada. Both recent (Table 3) and non-recent (Table 2) immigrants face substantial economy-wide and within-…rm mean wage gaps in comparison to Canadian-born white workers. Unsurprisingly, mean wage gaps are larger for recent immigrants than non-recent immigrants, and larger for visible minority immigrants than white immigrants. Immigrant workers also face substantial glass doors that account for between one quarter and one half of the economy-wide wage gaps they face. Mean glass door e¤ects are larger for recent immigrants than non-recent immigrants, and larger for visible minority immigrants than white immigrants. The former suggests that inter-…rm sorting is one avenue whereby immigrant wage outcomes improve with time spent in the host country.
Non-recent male immigrants to Canada face an economy-wide glass ceiling and are conse- The fact that recent male immigrants, especially visible minorities, face a sticky ‡oor and non-recent male immigrants face a glass ceiling is telling. It suggests that recently arrived men sort initially into very low-wage jobs. Over time, their outcomes improve as they move up the wage distribution. Eventually, however, they hit a glass ceiling that prevents further progress.
At each stage, inter-…rm sorting is important -exacerbating the sticky ‡oor they face shortly after arrival, and contributing to the glass ceiling they face later on.
Albrecht, J., A. Bjorklund, and S. Vroman (2003) . Is there a glass ceiling in Sweden? Journal of Labor Economics 21 (1), 145-177.
Angrist, J., V. Chernozhukov, and I. Fernández-Val (2006 
The intuition underlying the proof of Proposition 1 is straightforward. Note that M Z is idempotent, so we can rewrite the bias term as
whereG = M X G is a matrix of residuals in the least squares regression of the group membership indicators on X: Therefore G 0G
1G 0 F can be interpreted as estimated coe¢ cients in the least squares regression of F on the component of group membership that is unrelated to individual characteristics,G. In the simple case where X is orthogonal to G and F; so that G 0 M X G = G 0 G and G 0 M X F = G 0 F; the bias is (G 0 G) 1 G 0 F : In this case, bias in the group g wage di¤erential,^ g , is the average …rm e¤ect of all employers of group g's members: E
where N g is the sample number of workers in group g; and (i) is the …rm e¤ect of worker i's employer. More generally, the bias is interpreted as the average …rm e¤ect of group g's employers, net of the component that is explained by sorting on observable characteristics, X:
Our measure of the glass door e¤ect is easily extended beyond the simple dummy-variable speci…cation of group membership. Consider the fully interacted model where w 0 i = [1 g 0 i ] x 0 i ; and let W be the matrix with rows w 0 i . Assume that the correctly speci…ed model is E [yjX; G; F] = W + F . In this model, the within-…rm wage gap depends on X, and can be evaluated by comparing predicted values for members of a particular group to predicted values for the reference group. The least squares estimator of in this regression is unbiased. When the estimated equation omits …rm e¤ects, the omitted variables bias is E
is the coe¢ cient in an arti…cial regression of F on W. Just as the within-…rm wage gap depends on X, so too does the glass door e¤ect, which is evaluated by comparing predicted values of w 0 i b
for members of each group to predicted values for the reference group: To see the quantile analog of Proposition 1, let and be coe¢ cient vectors on [X G] in quantile regressions that exclude and include …rm e¤ects, respectively, at the th quantile. Angrist et al. (2006, p. 547) show that the bias due to omitted …rm e¤ects takes the form 
The intuition for this result is straightforward. G 0 M X gives the residuals from least squares regression of G on X: Regressing these on X and F yields residuals (G 0 M X M [X F] ) that are the same as those obtained from the regression of G on X and
: Under standard regularity conditions, b and b are asymptotically normal and hence so is their di¤erence, so that Q 2 1 under the null. Proof of Remark 3.
Let N denote the number of observations, k denote the rank of [X G] ; and e denote the least squares residual vector in the mis-speci…ed model. Then the usual estimator of the error variance in the mis-speci…ed model, s 2 = e 0 e = (N k ) ; has For representation, ** indicates difference from population quantile is statistically significant at 5% level and * indicates this difference is statistically significant at 10% level. Columns (1) and (4) are based on separate regressions for 32,898 men and 25,400 women. Columns (2) and (5) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) WHITE Mean wage differential -0.067** -0.047** -0.020** -0.039** -0.019** -0.020** (0.008) (0 (2) and (5) are based on pooled regressions for men and women, with all controls except firm effects interacted with sex, averaged over 50 random samples of 1,500 firms with at least 2 employees. Mean number of observations in the 50 random samples is 17,906. For representation, ** indicates difference from population quantile is statistically significant at 5% level and * indicates this difference is statistically significant at 10% level. Columns (1) and (4) are based on separate regressions for 32,898 men and 25,400 women. Columns (2) and (5) are based on pooled regressions for men and women, with all controls except firm effects interacted with sex, averaged over 50 random samples of 1,500 firms with at least 2 employees. Mean number of observations in the 50 random samples is 17,906.
VISIBLE MINORITY

ESTIMATES FOR NON-RECENT IMMIGRANTS (> 10 YEARS SINCE IMMIGRATION)
TABLE 3 ESTIMATES FOR RECENT IMMIGRANTS (≤ 10 YEARS SINCE IMMIGRATION)
MEN WOMEN
Supplementary Appendix
Appendix Table 1 reports sample means for our six groups of workers. There are few surprises here. Immigrants are much more likely to belong to a visible minority group than the Canadianborn. Roughly one quarter of sampled immigrants have been in Canada 10 years or less, and they are heavily concentrated in Census Metropolitan Areas and provinces with large cities. In comparison to the Canadian-born, the average immigrant worker is more likely to be male, has higher educational attainment, is more likely to be married and have children, more likely to be employed full time, less likely to belong to a union, and has fewer years of employer seniority.
Appendix Tables 2 through 6 report results of some alternate speci…cations of our wage regressions. These speci…cations allow us to assess the contribution of individual characteristics, geographic characteristics, job characteristics, and employer characteristics to wage outcomes.
Individual, geographic, and job characteristics were reported in the main text. Employer characteristics include number of employees (4 categories), number of competitors (5 categories), industry (14 categories), the natural logarithm of revenue per worker, and indicators for a minority recruitment program, an employment equity program, a pay equity program, a formal grievance or complaint system, and for non-pro…t enterprises.
In each of the Appendix tables, we present unconditional estimates in column 1, and conditional estimates in columns 2-6. Column 2 introduces controls for individual characteristics.
We add controls for region of residence in column 3, job characteristics in column 4, observed employer characteristics in column 5, and unobserved employer characteristics (…rm e¤ects) in column 6. Columns 4 and 6 correspond to the speci…cations reported in the main text.
There are some surprisingly consistent patterns across speci…cations. Outcomes conditional on personal characteristics and region of residence are worse than unconditional outcomes, which indicates that adverse wage outcomes of immigrants and visible minorities are partly ameliorated by their personal characteristics and regional sorting. Outcomes are generally better conditional on job and employer characteristics, which indicates that the poor wage outcomes of immigrants are partly due to sorting into low-wage employers and into jobs with low-wage characteristics.
As we have seen, the latter is largely the consequence of glass door e¤ects. We note that controlling for observable employer characteristics (column 5) yields estimates that are very similar to the across-…rm speci…cations reported in the main text (column 4 in the Appendix tables). Indeed, the disparity between these estimates and our within-…rm estimates (column 1 6 in the Appendix tables) highlights that glass door e¤ects are strongly related to unobserved employer characteristics. 
APPENDIX TABLE 2 ESTIMATES FOR CANADIAN-BORN VISIBLE MINORITIES
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. Reference category for differentials is Canadian born, white. For differentials, ** indicates statistically significant at 5% level and * indicates statistically significant at 10% level. For representation, ** indicates difference from population quantile is statistically significant at 5% level and * indicates this difference is statistically significant at 10% level. Columns (2)-(5) are based on separate regressions for 32,898 men and 25,400 women. Column (6) is based on pooled regressions for men and women, with all controls except firm effects interacted with sex, averaged over 50 random samples of 1,500 firms with at least 2 employees. Mean number of observations in the 50 random samples is 17,906.
(1)
(2)
(3) (4) (5) (6) WHITE Mean wage differential 0.067** -0.014 -0.062** -0.067** -0.049** -0.047** (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.006) Quantile differential 10th percentile 0.083* -0.067** -0.065** -0.059** -0.038** -0.051** (0.041) (0 
APPENDIX TABLE 3 ESTIMATES FOR MALE IMMIGRANTS, > 10 YEARS SINCE IMMIGRATION
(3) (4) (5) (6) WHITE Mean wage differential 0.049** 0.001 -0.054** -0.039** -0.027** -0.019** (0.011) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.007) (0.006) Quantile differential 10th percentile 0.057** -0.007 -0.083** -0.058** -0 
APPENDIX TABLE 4 ESTIMATES FOR FEMALE IMMIGRANTS, > 10 YEARS SINCE IMMIGRATION
(3) (4) (5) (6) WHITE Mean wage differential 0.009 -0.084** -0.134** -0.068** -0.066** -0.028** (0.020) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.014) Quantile differential 10th percentile -0.003 -0.051* -0.082** -0.085** -0.075** -0.089** (0.110) (0.027) (0.023) (0.035) (0.021) (0.025) Median -0.007 -0.065** -0.156** -0.114** -0 Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. Reference category for differentials is Canadian born, white. For differentials, ** indicates statistically significant at 5% level and * indicates statistically significant at 10% level. For representation, ** indicates difference from population quantile is statistically significant at 5% level and * indicates this difference is statistically significant at 10% level. Columns (2)-(5) are based on separate regressions for 32,898 men and 25,400 women. Column (6) is based on pooled regressions for men and women, with all controls except firm effects interacted with sex, averaged over 50 random samples of 1,500 firms with at least 2 employees. Mean number of observations in the 50 random samples is 17,906.
VISIBLE MINORITY
(3) (4) (5) (6) WHITE Mean wage differential -0.114** -0.170** -0.235** -0.096** -0.102** -0.060** (0.021) (0.022) (0.022) (0.018) (0.018) (0.017) Quantile differential 10th percentile -0.053** -0.097 -0.197 -0.147** -0.147** -0.055* (0.004) (0.210) (0.134) (0.026) (0.029) (0.031) Median -0.141** -0.201** -0.225** -0.106** -0.071** -0.052** (0 Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. Reference category for differentials is Canadian born, white. For differentials, ** indicates statistically significant at 5% level and * indicates statistically significant at 10% level. For representation, ** indicates difference from population quantile is statistically significant at 5% level and * indicates this difference is statistically significant at 10% level. Columns (2)-(5) are based on separate regressions for 32,898 men and 25,400 women. Column (6) is based on pooled regressions for men and women, with all controls except firm effects interacted with sex, averaged over 50 random samples of 1,500 firms with at least 2 employees. Mean number of observations in the 50 random samples is 17,906.
